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I. INTRODUCTION
The Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA"),' enacted by Congress
in 1996, purports to free states of the obligation to recognize same-sex
marriages celebrated in other states, or to recognize any right or claim
arising from such marriages. 2 While much of the scholarly literature
on DOMA addresses its constitutionality and its impact on same-sex
couples, I wish to examine DOMA's effect on parent-child
relationships. To the extent that scholars have examined DOMA's
impact on parent-child relationships, they have focused primarily on
unhappy families, examining the unique problems that arise when
same-sex couples with children separate and states compete for
jurisdictional authority to determine the child custody and visitation
issues. 3 While those issues are of great importance and interest, I will
focus instead on DOMA's impact on the happy family. In particular, I
1. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996)
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006) and 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006)).
2. Section two of DOMA provides: "No State ... shall be required to give
effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State ...
respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a
marriage under the laws of such other State . . . or a right or claim arising from such

a relationship." Id. § 2(a). Section three of DOMA provides: "In determining the
meaning of [a federal law] . . . the word 'marriage'

means only a legal union

between one man and one woman as husband and wife." Id. § 3(a). This section of
DOMA was recently struck down as unconstitutional in a lawsuit filed by
Symposium participant Mary Bonauto. See Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F.
Supp. 2d 374, 396 (D. Mass. 2010); Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of Health &
Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234, 253 (D. Mass. 2010).
3. See, e.g., Kathryn J. Harvey, Note, The Rights of Divorced Lesbians:
Interstate Recognition of Child Custody Judgments in the Context of Same-Sex
Divorce, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1379, 1422-25 (2009) (concluding that DOMA
partially repealed the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act ("PKPA")); Alison M.
Schmieder, Best Interests and ParentalPresumptions: Bringing Same-Sex Custody
Agreements Beyond Preclusion by the FederalDefense of MarriageAct, 17 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 293, 295 (2008) ("DOMA should not preclude recognition of
cross-state custody agreements."); Mark Strasser, Interstate Recognition of
Adoptions: On Jurisdiction,Full Faith and Credit, and the Kinds of Challenges the
Future May Bring, 2008 BYU L. REV. 1809, 1840 (footnote omitted) ("[Finding] no
evidence that it was Congress's intent to modify the PKPA when it passed
DOMA."); see also Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d 330, 336 (Va. Ct.
App. 2006) (rejecting the argument that "DOMA .

.

. was intended to affect or

partially repeal the PKPA"), aff'd, 661 S.E.2d 822 (Va. 2008).
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seek to determine the effect, if any, that DOMA has on a state's
obligation to recognize relationships between children and their gay or
lesbian parents, created under the laws of other states, when the family
remains intact and happy.
My thesis is that DOMA's impact on the happy family is a lesson
in irony. Here's the argument: in enacting DOMA, Congress chose to
protect heterosexual marriage because of its "deep and abiding interest
in encouraging responsible procreation and child-rearing. Simply put,
government has an interest in marriage because it has an interest in
children."' State family law, too, recognizes that children thrive when
they are raised by parents in a committed relationship.s In fact, under
both state family law and federal constitutional law, the willingness of
a father to marry or otherwise commit to the mother of his child
actually bolsters the legal protections afforded to his relationship with
his children. 6 Given this implicit recognition that children are better
off living with two parents who not only love their children, but also
love one other, it is deeply ironic that DOMA may reduce the
likelihood that a child's relationship with her gay or lesbian parents
will be recognized if the parents marry and rely on the marital
presumption of parentage. For a law intended to protect marriage as a
means of protecting children, this potential result is ironic indeed.
This Article will proceed in three parts. Part II will examine
DOMA's legislative history to demonstrate that Congress intended
DOMA, in no small part, to protect children. Part III will briefly
discuss the role marriage plays in bolstering a man's claim to be
recognized as a parent. And Part IV will demonstrate that under
DOMA, marriage between a child's gay or lesbian parents may
actually undermine, rather than strengthen, her legal relationship with
her parents in states that are hostile to same-sex marriage.

4. H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 13 (1996), reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905,
2917; see also id. at 14 (footnote omitted) (discussing the "irreplaceable role that
marriage plays in childrearing and in generational continuity").
5. See infra Part III.A.
6. See infra Part III.
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II. DOMA's LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND ITS GOALS

DOMA was introduced in the wake of Baehr v. Lewin,7 the
Hawaii Supreme Court decision that presumed Hawaii's marriage
statute, which authorized only opposite-sex marriage, was
unconstitutional unless the state could prove a compelling state
interest and demonstrate the statute was narrowly drawn to avoid
infringement of constitutional rights.8 A Hawaii court scheduled trial
in Hawaii was scheduled for September 1996, and many expected the
Hawaii courts to require the state to issue marriage licenses to samesex couples. 9 The legislatures in other states were in a frenzy; they
debated and rapidly passed laws designed to deny gays and lesbians
the opportunity to marry and to reinforce the states' prerogatives to
deny recognition to same-sex marriages that might be celebrated in
Hawaii or elsewhere.'o In fact, it was these states' concerns, reflected
in this flurry of legislative activity, that persuaded the House Judiciary
Committee that federal legislation was warranted."
Congress designed DOMA to serve two primary purposes: "to
defend the institution of traditional heterosexual marriage," and "to
protect the right of the States to formulate their own public policy
regarding the legal recognition of same-sex unions, free from any
federal constitutional implications that might attend the recognition by
one State of the right for homosexual couples to acquire marriage
licenses."' 2 The House Judiciary Committee Report explained the
preferred legal status of heterosexual marriage by identifying civil
society's "deep and abiding interest in encouraging responsible
procreation and child-rearing. Simply put, government has an interest
in marriage because it has an interest in children."1 3 It quoted a
Council on Families in America Report, which identified "'the
irreplaceable role that marriage plays in childrearing and in

7. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (plurality opinion).
8. Id. at 67.
9. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 5 (discussing a "strong possibility").
10. Id. at 9-10
11. Id.
12. Id. at 2. In addition, Congress designed DOMA to "defend[] traditional
notions of morality" and to "preserv[e] scarce government resources." Id. at 12.
13. Id. at 13.
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generational continuity."'l 4 And a co-sponsor of the bill, the late
Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia, opined that the very purpose of
heterosexual marriage itself is to establish "a home atmosphere in
which a man and a woman pledge themselves exclusively to one
another and who bring into being children for the fulfillment of their
love for one another and for the greater good of the human community
at large."' 5 In short, DOMA's celebration of heterosexual marriage
reflected a deep concern for the well-being of children and a
recognition that children thrive when they are raised by two parents
who not only love their children, but also love one another.
III. THE ROLE OF MARRIAGE IN DETERMINING PARENTHOOD

This respect for marriage, and the role it plays in providing
children with secure and loving two-parent homes, is not only
reflected in DOMA, but in state family law as well, particularly in the
law governing parentage. The point I wish to make here is a modest
one: state law not only respects the institution of marriage, but it
recognizes the benefits children receive when they are raised in an
intact family. The law's respect for marriage as an incubator of
healthy children is not only reflected in the marital presumption of
paternity, but also in a line of United States Supreme Court cases
addressing the constitutional rights of unwed fathers. We will analyze
these areas of the law in turn.
A. The MaritalPresumption ofPaternity
At common law, motherhood was a function of biology, and
fatherhood was a function of marriage, so a woman who gave birth to
a child was its mother, and her husband was its father.16 This marital
presumption of paternity conclusively presumed that any child born
14. Id. at 14 (footnote omitted).
15. 142 CONG. REc. 22436, 22446 (1996) (statement of Sen. Byrd) (emphasis
added).
16. In re Sebastian, 879 N.Y.S.2d 677, 679 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2009); Theresa
Glennon, Somebody's Child: Evaluating the Erosion of the Marital Presumption of
Paternity, 102 W. VA. L. REv. 547, 550, 562-63 (2000); Paula Roberts, Biology and
Beyond: The Casefor Passage of the New Uniform ParentageAct, 35 FAM. L.Q. 41,
44 (2001); Jana Singer, Marriage,Biology, and Paternity: The Case for Revitalizing
the MaritalPresumption,65 MD. L. REv. 246, 248 (2006).
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during a marriage was the legal child of the mother's husband; the
presumption could be rebutted only by proof that the husband was
sterile or lacked access to his wife during the period of conception.' 7
The marital presumption of paternity was one of the strongest
presumptions in law,' 8 and some courts and commentators maintain
that it remains "one of the most firmly-established and persuasive
precepts known in law."l 9
A child bom out of wedlock had only one legal parent at common
law-the mother.2 0 Because legislators recognized that children were
better off with two legal parents who were obligated to support them,
states enacted statutes authorizing filiation or paternity proceedings to
establish the parenthood of a biological father who was not married to
the child's mother.2 ' Initially, these proceedings were quasi-criminal
17. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124 (1989) (plurality
opinion) (citations omitted); AM. LAW. INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY

DISSOL.TION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.03 cmt. d (2000); Roberts,
supra note 16, at 44. This presumption is sometimes referred to as the presumption
of legitimacy. See, e.g., Susan F. Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the
Presumption ofLegitimacy in the Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV. 227, 22829 (2006); Munonyedi Ugbode, Note, Who's Your Daddy?: Why the Presumption of
Legitimacy Should be Abandoned in Vermont, 34 VT. L. REV. 683, 685 (2010). It is
also known as the presumption of parentage. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Rosato, Children
of Same-Sex ParentsDeserve the Security Blanket of the ParentagePresumption, 44
FAM. CT. REV. 74, 74 (2006).
18. Debi McRae, Evaluating the Effectiveness of the Best Interests Marital
Presumption of Paternity:It Is Actually in the Best Interests of Children to Divorce
the Current Application of the Best Interests Marital Presumption of Paternity, 5
WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 345, 353 (2006).
19. Baker v. Baker, 582 S.E.2d 102, 103 (Ga. 2003); see e.g., Brenda J.
Runner, Protecting a Husband's Parental Rights When His Wife Disputes the
Presumption of Legitimacy, 28 J. FAM. L. 115, 116 (1989-90) (footnote omitted)
("One of the strongest presumptions in law is that a child born to a married woman
is the legitimate child of her husband.").
20. In re Sebastian, 879 N.Y.S.2d at 679.
21. Id. at 679, 688-89; see also Hough v. Light, 89 N.Y.S.2d 361, 363 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1949) ("An affiliation proceeding is a creature of statute . . . . Its twofold
purpose, to determine paternity and to secure support for the child, was unknown to
the common law."). The state's interest is not entirely altruistic in that an
establishment of paternity frees the state of potential financial responsibility for the
child. In re Dep't of Soc. Servs. ex rel. Sandra C. v. Thomas J.S., 474 N.Y.S.2d 322,
330 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) ("[T]he protection of the community against burdensome
taxation produced by the acts of the individuals in derogation of public policy was a
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in nature. 22 In 1993 Congress required states to develop simple
processes, such as in-hospital acknowledgment programs, whereby
unwed fathers could voluntarily acknowledge paternity and have their
names placed on the child's birth certificate.2 3 This legislative action
reflected both the dramatic increase in the percentage of children born
out of wedlock in recent decades, 24 and the government's growing
interest in shifting financial responsibility for non-marital children
onto their biological parents.2 5
Today a man has more opportunities to establish a legal
relationship with his child than he had at common law, even if he
declines to marry the child's mother. But the law still reflects the view
that children are typically better off being raised by parents who are
married to each other. This recognition is reflected in the modern
marital presumption of paternity. 26 The presumption today is a
rebuttable one, 27 often codified by statute, 28 that varies in strength
paramount consideration in the enactment of the modem paternity statutes."); see
also In re Sebastian, 879 N.Y.S.2d at 689 n.42.
22. Leslie Joan Harris, The Basis for Legal Parentageand the Clash Between
Custody and Child Support, 42 IND. L. REV. 611, 617 (2009); Roberts, supra note
16, at 45.
23. Singer, supra note 16, at 250-53 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(C)(i)
(2006)) (describing "early and expedited procedures for voluntary acknowledgement
of paternity"). Such voluntary acknowledgments are entitled to full faith and credit
in other states. Id. at 251 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(C)(iv) (2006)); see also
Harris, supra note 22, at 620 (describing federal pressure on states to establish the
paternity of unwed fathers and to impose child support obligations on them).
24.

STEPHANIE J. VENTURA, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,

CHANGING PATTERNS OF NONMARITAL CHILDBEARING IN THE UNITED STATES,

NCHS

DATA

BRIEF

No.

18,

at

2

(May

2009),

available

at

http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/dbl8.pdf ("In 2007, nearly 4 in 10 births
were to unmarried women: The proportion of all births to unmarried women was
39.7%, up from 34% in 2002. The 2007 proportion was more than double that for
1980 (18.4%)."). See also Harris,supra note 22, at 618-19.
25. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 16, at 249-50.
26. Rebecca Moulton, Who's Your Daddy? The Inherent Unfairness of the
Marital Presumption for Children of Unmarried Parents, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 698,
700 n.18 (2009) ("Approximately thirty-five of the fifty states have a marital
presumption of legitimacy.").
27. AM. LAW. INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.03 cmt. d (2000); McRae, supra note 18, at

355.
28. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7540 (West 2004) ("Except as provided in
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from state to state. 29 The marital presumption of paternity is designed
to protect children from the stigma of illegitimacy, ensure financial
support from two parents, preserve public resources, and protect the
integrity of marriage and the stability of an intact family (at least in
part by limiting or precluding inquiries into the couple's sex life and
the wife's fidelity). 30
In recent years, the stigma and disadvantages of illegitimacy have
diminished.' Moreover, with the greater availability of reliable DNA
testing, some states now permit formerly married men to rebut the
marital presumption of paternity. This scientific evidence is used to
prove that they are not the biological fathers of children born to their
former wives during marriage. 32 These men seek to rebut the
presumption in order to avoid an obligation to financially support
children with whom they have no biological connection. Since one of
the policies underlying the marital presumption of paternity is to
preserve the marriage-and in these cases there is no longer a
salvageable marriage to preserve-some states have concluded the
Section 7541, the child of a wife cohabiting with her husband, who is not impotent
or sterile, is conclusively presumed to be a child of the marriage."); CAL. FAM.
CODE § 7541 (West 2004) (permitting the presumption to be rebutted by blood tests
within two years of the child's birth in certain cases); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT
§ 204(a) (2000, amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 311 (2001 & Supp. 2009) ("A man is
presumed to be father of a child if: (1) he and the mother of the child are married to
each other and the child is born during the marriage.") (adopted in 8 states); UNIF.
PARENTAGE ACT § 4(a)(1) (1973), 9B U.L.A. 393 (2001 & Supp. 2009) ("A man is
presumed to be the natural father of a child if (1) he and the child's natural mother
are or have been married to each other and the child is born during the marriage
.") (adopted in 13 states).
29. AM. LAW. INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.03 Reporter's Notes (2000); Appleton,
...

supra note 17, at 234-36.
30. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 125 (1989) (plurality opinion);
Appleton, supra note 17, at 237, 242-59; Harris, supra note 22, at 615; McRae,
supra note 18, at 349, 359-63; Roberts, supra note 16, at 53-54; Singer, supra note
16, at 249, 256-57; Ugbode, supra note 17, at 686-87.
31. See, e.g., Appleton, supra note 17, at 228, 243-44; Glennon, supra note 16,
at 554.
32. See, e.g., Doran v. Doran, 820 A.2d 1279, 1282-83 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003);
Michael K.T. v. Tina L.T., 387 S.E.2d 866, 870 (W. Va. 1989); Appleton, supra
note 17, at 235-36 & n.36 ("[A]t least six jurisdictions allow a husband to
disestablish paternity at the time of divorce."); Glennon, supra note 16, at 559, 566,
577-82; Harris, supra note 22, at 632-33.
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marital presumption of paternity no longer applies (or may be rebutted
by scientific evidence). 33
But even as some states acknowledge the diminished force of the
marital presumption of paternity when a marriage fails, many remain
reluctant to "award substantive parental rights to the natural father of a
child conceived within, and born into, an extant marital union that
wishes to embrace the child." 34 Some states permit the presumption of
parentage to be rebutted only if doing so would serve the child's best
interests. 35 In these states, when alleged biological fathers claim
paternity of children born during an intact marriage, courts decline to
order blood tests or DNA tests to determine paternity unless the
determination would be in the child's best interests. 36 Courts make
this best interest determination by balancing the putative father's
interest in establishing his status as the child's biological father
against the married couple's interest in protecting their marriage and
33. See, e.g., Doran, 820 A.2d at 1283; Michael K.T., 387 S.E.2d at 870; see
also Fish v. Behers, 741 A.2d 721, 723 (Pa. 1999) (concluding that the marital
presumption of paternity did not apply in a suit for child support by a mother against
the biological father of her child born during her marriage to her former husband;
"there is no longer an intact family or a marriage to preserve."). These states
"elevate fairness to husbands ... over and above protection of child welfare (by
permitting disruption of well established, functional father-child relationships)."
Appleton, supra note 17, at 244 (footnote omitted); accord Glennon, supra note 16,
at 592-93. In some cases, divorcing mothers challenge the paternity of their children
to defeat a husband's claim to child custody. See, e.g., Baker v. Baker, 582 S.E.2d
102, 102 (Ga. 2003); Glennon, supra note 16, at 582-85.
34. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127 (plurality opinion) (disclaiming awareness of
even a single case that awarded substantive parental rights to the biological father of
a child conceived and delivered by a married woman).
35. Appleton, supra note 17, at 235 & n.35 (identifying approximately twelve
states that permit the presumption of parentage to be rebutted if it would serve the
child's best interests); see also UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 608(b) (2000, amended
2002), 9B U.L.A. 49 (Supp. 2009); Harris, supra note 22, at 623, 634-36.
36. See, e.g., R.N. v. J.M., 61 S.W.3d 149, 155, 157 (Ark. 2001); Evans v.
Wilson, 856 A.2d 679, 692 (Md. 2004); In re Paternity of C.A.S., 468 N.W.2d 719,
726 (Wis. 1991); see also Baker, 582 S.E.2d at 106 (concluding that the trial court
should have determined whether it was in the child's best interest to permit the
mother to "delegitimize" the child where a divorcing mother sought to prove that her
husband was not the father of her child). Even when statutes authorize challenges to
a presumed father's paternity without requiring a best interest analysis, courts have
declined to order testing unless a decision in favor of the alleged biological father
would be in the child's best interests. Glennon, supra note 16, at 574-75.
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their family. 37 Courts are quite reluctant to undercut the marital
presumption when the mother and her husband have co-parented the
child, the husband has provided financial and emotional support to the
child, and the child has bonded with the husband.38 The United States
Supreme Court in Michael H. v. Gerald D39 noted that "even in
modern times ... the ability of [a man who purportedly fathered the
child of a married woman] to claim paternity has not been generally
acknowledged." 4 0
B. Marriageand the ConstitutionalRights ofFathers
Not only does the state law marital presumption of paternity
emphasize the saliency of marriage in determining parentage, but so
does a line of United States Supreme Court cases that delineates the
federal constitutional rights of unwed fathers. In these cases, the Court
has determined the circumstances in which an unwed father has a
constitutionally protected interest in his relationship with his nonmarital child, and the constitutionality of distinctions drawn by state
laws between unwed fathers and once-married fathers. In Quilloin v.
Walcott4 1 the Court unanimously upheld the constitutionality of a
Georgia adoption statute that treated unwed fathers differently from
other parents, including once-married fathers. 42 The statute barred the
adoption of a marital child unless each living parent voluntarily
surrendered rights to the child or was found to be unfit; however, the
statute required only the mother's consent regarding a child born out
37. See, e.g., Evans, 856 A.2d at 693 (citing Turner v. Whisted, 607 A.2d 935,
940 (Md. 1992)). The Uniform Parentage Act ("UPA") lists additional factors to be
considered in assessing the child's best interests. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT
§ 608(b)(1)-(9) (2000, amended 2002).
38. See, e.g., R.N., 61 S.W.3d at 155 (stating a party seeking to rebut the
presumption must first show that doing so is "in the best interest of a child whose
parents were married at the time the child was born and perhaps, as in this case,
remain married and plan to continue as the only parents the child has ever known");
Evans, 856 A.2d at 693; In re Paternityof C.A.S., 468 N.W.2d at 726-27, 729.
39. 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (plurality opinion).
40. Id. at 125. But see Appleton, supra note 17, at 236 & n.37 ("[A] few states
recognize a 'right' on the part of putative fathers to challenge a husband's status as
father.").
41. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
42. Id. at 248.

2010]

DOMA AND THE HAPPY FAMILY: A LESSON IN IRONY

285

of wedlock.4 3 To acquire a right to veto the adoption of his child an
unwed father had to marry the mother, acknowledge the child as his
own, or obtain a legal order legitimating the child.4 4 The Court found
no violation of due process because the unwed father, Leon Webster
Quilloin, never sought or had physical or legal custody of his child
during the child's first eleven years; the mother had married another
man; and the trial court found that an adoption by the child's
stepfather would be in the child's best interests.45
The biological father argued that the statute nevertheless violated
equal protection because his interests were indistinguishable from
those of a once-married father who divorced the mother and no longer
lived with his child.4 6 The Court rejected this contention noting that
Quilloin "never exercised actual or legal custody over his child,"
whereas "legal custody of children is, of course, a central aspect of the
marital relationship, and even a father whose marriage has broken
apart will have borne full responsibility for the rearing of his children
during the period of the marriage."4 7 Thus, the Court concluded that
by virtue of having been married to his child's mother and having
lived with his child during the marriage, a once-married father was
entitled to greater legal protection than an unwed father who never
made a legal commitment to his child's mother and never had custody
of his child.
In Lehr v. Robertson48 the Court recognized even more explicitly
that "[tlhe institution of marriage has played a critical role ... in
defining the legal entitlements of family members . ."4 and noted

that "state laws almost universally express an appropriate preference

43. Id. (citing GA. CODE § 74-403(1), (3) (1975)).
44. Id. at 249 (citing GA. CODE §§ 74-101, 74-103 (1975)).
45. Id. at 255.
46. Id. at 256. The Court did not rule on the birth father's claim that the statute
unconstitutionally distinguished between unwed mothers and fathers. Id. at 253 n. 13.
47. Id. at 256; cf Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979) (footnote
omitted) (striking down an adoption statute that required the consent of an unwed
mother, but not an unwed father; concluding that "this undifferentiated distinction
between unwed mothers and unwed fathers . . . does not bear a substantial

relationship to the State's asserted interests.").
48. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
49. Id. at 256-57 (footnote omitted).
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for the formal family."s 0 The Court emphasized that a mere biological
relationship between a man and his child is not determinative of a
constitutionally protected relationship; the biological connection is
meaningful only to the extent that:
it offers the natural father an opportunity that no other male
possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring. If he grasps
that opportunity and accepts some measure of responsibility for the
child's future, he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child
relationship and make uniquely valuable contributions to the child's
development.51
In commenting on the means by which a biological father may
grasp this opportunity, the Lehr Court opined that "[t]he most
effective protection of the putative father's opportunity to develop a
relationship with his child is provided by the laws that authorize
formal marriageand govern its consequences." 52
In emphasizing that marriage to his child's mother is the most
effective way for a man to preserve and develop a relationship with
his child, both the Court in Lehr and the plurality in Michael H.
quoted Justice Stewart's dissent in Caban v. Mohammed,53 which
made this point more fully:
The Constitution does not require that an unmarried father's
substantive parental rights must always be coextensive with those
afforded to the fathers of legitimate children. In this setting, it is
plain that the absence of a legal tie with the mother provides a

constitutionally valid ground for distinction ....
Parental rights do not spring full-blown from the biological
connection between parent and child. They require relationships
more enduring. The mother carries and bears the child, and in this
sense her parental relationship is clear. The validity of the father's

parental claim must be gauged by other measures. By tradition, the
primary measure has been the legitimate familial relationship he
creates with the child by marriage with the mother ...

50. Id. at 257 (footnote omitted).
51. Id. at 262 (footnote omitted).
52. Id. at 263 (emphasis added).
53. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).

. [T]he
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absence of a legal tie with the mother may in [some] circumstances
appropriatelyplace a limit on whatever substantive constitutional
claims might otherwise exist by virtue of the father's actual
relationshipwith the children.54

The plurality in Michael H. reiterated this point: "[when a] child is
born into an extant marital family, the natural father's unique
opportunity conflicts with the similarly unique opportunity of the
husband of the marriage; and it is not unconstitutional for the State to
give categorical preference to the latter."55
In sum, both the state law marital presumption of paternity and the
United States Supreme Court case law on unwed fathers'
constitutional rights emphasize that a man's willingness to marry the
mother of his child enhances his claim to have a constitutionally
protected relationship with his child. Like DOMA, these sources of
law reflect a deep respect for the institution of marriage and
acknowledge the benefits children receive when they are raised in an
intact family by parents who are committed both to one another and
their children.
IV. DOMA's POTENTIAL TO UNDERMINE PARENT-CHILD
RELATIONSHIPS

Given DOMA's deep respect for marriage, the law is ironic on
many levels. Most obviously, if Congress really wanted to defend
marriage, why didn't it provide counseling for distressed couples, seek
to eradicate spousal abuse, or provide other resources to struggling
couples? 56 Rather than defend marriage, DOMA undercuts it by
enabling states to deny marriage benefits to same-sex couples.
The irony I focus on here, however, is this: for heterosexual
couples, a decision to marry strengthens the legal bonds between
parent and child, whereas under DOMA, marriage has the opposite

54. Id. at 397 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (emphasis added), quoted in Lehr, 463
U.S. at 260 n.16; Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 129 (1989) (plurality
opinion).
55. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 129 (plurality opinion).
56. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. 22436, 22449 (1996) (statement of Sen. Boxer)
("[I]f we want to defend marriage, we should be discussing ways that truly help lift
the strains and stresses on marriage.").
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effect for gay and lesbian parents. The act of marriage may actually

undercut the legal bond between a gay or lesbian parent and his or her
child. Three subsidiary points must be established to support this
conclusion: first, the states that permit same-sex marriage treat the
children of either spouse, who are born during the marriage, as the
children of both spouses; second, the public policy exception to
traditional choice of law rules may permit states that are hostile to
same-sex marriage to apply their own family law, and thus to
disregard these legally-constructed parent-child relationships between
lesbian and gay parents and their non-biological children; and third,
the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Federal Constitution renders
this public policy exception unavailable where a court in one state
actually renders ajudgment determining that the non-biological parent
is a legal parent of the child. These three subsidiary points will be
established in turn before developing the central irony of this Article.
A. The MaritalPresumptionofParentageand Same-Sex Couples
Today, five states-Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, and Vermont-and the District of Columbia permit samesex couples to marry. These "marriage states" do, or at least should,
treat the children of either spouse born during a same-sex marriage as
the children of both spouses." In other words, what courts have

57. D.C. CODE § 46-401(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
457:1-a (LexisNexis Supp. 2009); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8 (Supp. 2009); Kerrigan
v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 476 (Conn. 2008); Varnum v. Brien, 763
N.W.2d 862, 906-07 (Iowa 2009); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d
943, 961-62 (Mass. 2003).
58. See infra notes 59-67; accord Deborah L. Forman, Interstate Recognition
of Same-Sex Parents in the Wake of Gay Marriage, Civil Unions, and Domestic
Partnerships, 46 B.C. L. REV. 1, 9 (2004); Courtney G. Joslin, Interstate
Recognition of Parentagein a Time of Disharmony: Same-Sex ParentFamiliesand
Beyond, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 563, 581 (2009) (footnote omitted) (stating that same-sex
couples that marry "are entitled to the same automatic parental rights and
responsibilities with regard to a child born to the couple as are conferred on
heterosexual couples"); Nancy D. Polikoff, A Mother Should Not Have to Adopt Her
Own Child: ParentageLaws for Children of Lesbian Couples in the Twenty-First
Century, 5 STAN. J. Civ. RTS. & CIv. LIBERTIES 201, 215 (2009) ("[A] female
spouse . . . of a woman who bears a child receives the same presumption of

parentage that a husband receives."); id. at 248; Rosato, supranote 17, at 75-76.
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referred to as the marital presumption of paternity has become a
gender-neutral marital presumption of parentage.
As a normative matter, strong arguments can be made that the
marital presumption of parentage should apply to children born during
a same-sex marriage. Children of lesbian and gay parents benefit from
having two legal parents (especially two legal parents who are
obligated to provide financial support).5 9 Likewise, application of the
presumption preserves public resources by assigning financial
responsibility to the non-biological parent, thereby reducing the need
for public support.60 While a marital presumption of parentage by
same-sex couples is so obviously counter-factual that it would not
discourage inquiries regarding fidelity and sexual activity,61 it
nevertheless would protect the stability and privacy of the unitary
family by shielding it from attacks by third parties. 62
Moreove r, while it is not entirely clear, it appears the states that
permit same-sex marriage do apply the marital presumption of
parentage to the children of same-sex parents; they treat the biological
child of one spouse born during the marriage to be the child of the
other spouse. This point is most clearly demonstrated in Iowa, which
has a gender-neutral statutory presumption of parentage that does not
distinguish between same-sex and opposite-sex couples: "A child or
children born of parents who, at any time prior or subsequent to the
birth of such child, have entered into a civil or religious marriage
ceremony, shall be deemed the legitimate child or children of both
parents . . . ."63 Vermont, too, has a statutory presumption of
parentage, which provides that "[a] person alleged to be a parent shall
be rebuttably presumed to be the natural parent of a child if .. . the

59. See Appleton, supra note 17, at 245-46, 260 (focusing on lesbian couples).
60. Id. at 246-48, 260.
61. Cf id. at 254 ("[P]retended biological relationships were to be regarded
and treated as 'real' familial relationships so long as the pretense was not obvious to
the outside observer.").
62. Id. at 248-51, 260; Ugbode, supra note 17, at 687.
63. IOWA CODE § 252A.3(4) (2008). Even in Iowa, however, the point is not
perfectly clear. The Iowa Department of Public Health has declined to issue a birth
certificate listing both spouses when a married lesbian has a child through artificial
insemination. Gay Couple Sues Over Birth Certificate, DES MOINES REG., May 14,
2010, at Al. The Department's practice is currently being challenged in court. Id.
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child is born while the husband and wife are legally married to each
other." 64
Other states that permit same-sex marriage employ a common law
marital presumption of parentage. For example, under New
Hampshire case law, a "child born in wedlock [is] presumed to be an
offspring of the marriage." 65 While the "marriage states" need to give
greater thought to the circumstances in which the marital presumption
of parentage may be rebutted and how it should apply when gay

64. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 308(4) (2002). Although the presumption may be
rebutted (and genetic evidence will invariably show that one spouse in a same-sex
couple is not a biological parent), the Vermont Supreme Court has refused to read
the statute as requiring a biological connection between parent and child. MillerJenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951, 967 (Vt. 2006). The court has stated that
same-sex and opposite-sex couples that employ artificial insemination should be
treated the same. Id. Since the Vermont legislature has not addressed parentage in
cases involving artificial insemination, the court has decided parentage issues in
such cases involving artificial insemination without formal reliance on the marital
presumption. Id. at 970. Nevertheless, the court concluded in Miller-Jenkins that the
spouse of the biological parent was also a parent, and the court emphasized that "the
couple's legal union at the time of the child's birth is extremely persuasive evidence
of joint parentage." Id. at 971 (emphasis added); see also Forman, supra note 58, at
11-15; Polikoff, supra note 58, at 215-17, 247-58.
Application of the marital presumption of parentage is even more
complicated when gay male couples enlist the assistance of a surrogate. If the spouse
of the gay biological father is presumed to be a father, does the surrogate retain any
legal relationship with the child? Does the child have three legal parents? See
Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 577 n.3 (Mass. 2004)
(Sosman, J., dissenting) (noting the Massachusetts statutory presumption is
expressly gender-based, presuming a married man to be the father of his wife's
child; suggesting that application of the presumption to a child carried by a surrogate
for a gay male couple would yield anomalous results; it might "make sense to
rethink precisely how this biologically impossible presumption of paternity ought to
apply to same-sex couples, and perhaps make some modification that would clarify
its operation in this novel context"); Appleton, supra note 17, at 261-68. These
important questions require greater attention by law makers and scholars and reflect
the law's ongoing struggle to balance the interests of intended parents (regardless of
sexual orientation), gestational surrogates, and their children.
65. Watts v. Watts, 337 A.2d 350, 352 (N.H. 1975) (citations omitted) ("[The
presumption] may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence such as a blood
test."); see also Elisa B. v. Super. Ct., 117 P.3d 660, 666 (Cal. 2005) (stating, in
dicta, that a registered domestic partner shall have the same rights and
responsibilities regarding the child of his or her partner as a spouse would have).
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married couples enlist the help of a surrogate, 66 it is fair to assert that
the states that authorize same-sex marriage do, or at least should,
extend the marital presumption of parentage to gay and lesbian
married couples who choose to have a child together.
To illustrate this first subsidiary point, consider a simple
hypothetical. Beth and Susan, life-long residents of Iowa, meet in
Iowa, marry in Iowa, and continue to live in Iowa. The women decide
to have a child, and Beth is impregnated with sperm donated by an
anonymous donor. When the child, Michael, is born, both women are
listed as parents on Michael's birth certificate. Under Iowa law, both
women are his legal parents even though Susan has no biological
connection to Michael. 6 7
B. Choice ofLaw and the Public PolicyException
If the family were to move to Florida at a later date, the second
subsidiary issue-choice of law-would be raised. Whether Florida
(or any other state) would recognize the parent-child relationship
between Susan and Michael would be governed, in the first instance,
by state choice of law rules. Of course, different states apply different
approaches to choice of law, and there is not time here to review all of
the possible approaches. Suffice it to say that under Restatement
(First) of Conflict of Laws, a child's legitimacy at birth is determined
"by the law of the state of domicil of that parent at that time."68 If the
child is the legitimate child of both parents under the law of the state
in which both parents are domiciled, then the child "will be
recognized everywhere as the legitimate [child]" of both parents. 69 If
Michael was the legitimate child of both mothers under Iowa law at
the time of his birth, then under the First Restatement, he would be
recognized as the legitimate child of both mothers in other states.
Likewise, under section 287 of the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws, legitimacy is determined
66. See supra note 64.
67. Cf supra note 63 (regarding the unwillingness of the Iowa Department of
Public Health to issue birth certificates and the resulting litigation). The hypothetical
avoids the complexities that may arise when a gay male couple enlists the assistance
of a surrogate. See supra note 64.
68. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 138 (1934).
69. Id. § 138 illus. (emphasis added).
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by the local law of the state which ... has the most significant
relationship to the child and the parent under the principles stated in
§ 6. The child will usually be held legitimate if this would be his
status under the local law of the state where ... the parent was
domiciled when the child's status of legitimacy is claimed to have
been created. .70

A comment to section 287 adds that one of the most relevant
factors is "protection of the justified expectations of the parties . . . ."71
The comment further notes that since "the law favors the status of
legitimacy over that of illegitimacy . .. a status of legitimacy once

created under the principles stated [here] will usually be recognized as
continuing to exist in the face of subsequent events, such as a change
of domicil by the parties."72 Both Beth and Susan were domiciled in
Iowa when Michael was born, and the family remained in Iowa for
years following his birth, so a court applying the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws would likely apply Iowa law to
determine Michael's parentage even after the family moved to Florida
(unless Florida claimed a more significant relationship to Michael and
Susan under the principles stated in section six of the Restatement).
Moreover, application of Iowa law would protect the parties'
reasonable expectations and, even more importantly, prevent the
"delegitimation" of the child.
While both Restatements support the application of the law of the
state in which the parents were domiciled at the time of a child's birth
to determine his legitimacy and parentage, both contain public policy
exceptions that could be invoked to deny recognition to the parentchild relationship. Section 612 of the Restatement (First) of Conflict
of Laws recognizes that "[n]o action can be maintained upon a cause
of action created in another state the enforcement of which is contrary
to the strong public policy of the forum."7 3 According to a comment to
section 612, this rule applies "when the entire basis of the claim upon
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 287 (1971). Section six
of the Second Restatement identifies a number of factors deemed relevant to choice
of law including the relevant policies of the forum state and other interested states,
and the protection of justified expectations. Id. § 6.
71. Id. § 287 cmt. d.
72. Id.
73.

RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

§ 612 (1934).
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which suit is brought is so contrary to the public policy of the forum
that it will withhold altogether the use of its courts to enforce the
claim." 74 The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws contains a
similar provision. The classic statement of the circumstances in
which the public policy exception may be invoked is found in the New
York Court of Appeals opinion Loucks v. StandardOil Co. of N.Y.,76
in which Justice Cardozo wrote, "[t]he courts [of a state] are not free
to refuse to enforce a foreign right at the pleasure of the judges, to suit
the individual notion of expediency or fairness. They do not close
their doors, unless help would violate some fundamental principle of
justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted
tradition of the common weal."77 The same court later reformulated
the test using even stronger language: "foreign-based rights should be
enforced unless . .. judicial enforcement . .. would be the approval of
a transaction which is inherently vicious, wicked or immoral, and
shocking to the prevailing moral sense."
It is difficult to see how a parent-child relationship that is the
product of neither rape nor incest could ever be deemed "inherently
vicious, wicked or immoral."7 9 But a state like Florida, which has a
mini-DOMA,8 0 nevertheless might invoke the public policy exception
and decline to apply Iowa's marital presumption of parentage. Or it
might conclude its mini-DOMA would override any common law
choice of law rule that otherwise would call for the application of
Iowa law to determine the child's legitimacy or parentage. After all,
under Florida law, "the term 'marriage' means only a legal union
between one man and one woman as husband and wife,"8 1 and
"[m]arriages between persons of the same sex ... are not recognized

74. Id. § 612 cmt. a.
75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 90 (1971) ("No action
will be entertained on a foreign cause of action the enforcement of which is contrary
to the strong public policy of the forum.").
76. 120 N.E. 198 (N.Y. 1918).
77. Id. at 202.
78. Intercontinental Hotels Corp. v. Golden, 203 N.E.2d 210, 212 (N.Y. 1964)
(citations omitted).
79. Id. at 212 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
80. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.212 (West 2010).
81. Id.

§ 741.212(3).
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for any purpose in [Florida]." 82 Moreover, "[t]he state, its agencies,
and its political subdivisions may not give effect to any public act,
record, or judicial proceeding of any state ... respecting ... a
marriage.. . not recognized under [this law] or a claim arisingfrom
such a marriage. .. ."8 The claim that Michael is the legitimate child
of his non-biological mother, Susan, arguably derives from Iowa's
statutory marital presumption of parentage. Therefore, Florida's miniDOMA might preclude the state, its agencies, and political
subdivisions from giving effect to the parentage claim. 84
C. The Full Faithand Credit Clause andJudgments
The final subsidiary point that needs to be addressed before
considering DOMA's ironic role is whether the Federal Constitution
would compel Florida to apply Iowa law to determine the existence of
a parent-child relationship in our hypothetical, or at least preclude it
from invoking its own public policy to disregard Iowa's marital
presumption of parentage. The United States Supreme Court has
acknowledged that in cases where more than one state has a legitimate
interest in the application of its law to a multi-state problem, the Full
Faith and Credit Clause does not compel the forum state to disregard
its own law and policy in favor of the foreign law." Rather, "[a] court
may be guided by the forum State's 'public policy' in determining the
law applicable to a controversy." 86 Thus, as long as the family moved
82. Id. § 741.212(1).
83. Id. § 741.212(2) (emphasis added).
84. Accord In re Sebastian, 879 N.Y.S.2d 677, 684 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2009)
("[Mini-DOMAs that express a public policy against same-sex marriage] would
appear to permit courts ... to deny recognition ... to legal rights flowing from

[same-sex] marriages, including presumptive parenthood."). Not all courts have
adopted this view. See infra notes 98-126 and accompanying text. For a more
comprehensive and somewhat different choice of law analysis, see Forman, supra
note 58, at 17-65.
85. Pac. Emp'rs Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 500-05
(1939); Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 545-50
(1935).
86. Thomas ex rel. Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998); see
also, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985) (citation
omitted) ("[T]he Due Process Clause and the Full Faith and Credit Clause provided
modest restrictions on the application of forum law. These restrictions required 'that
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to Florida (giving Florida some interest in applying its law to the
parent-child relationship), the Full Faith and Credit Clause would
likely not command application of the Iowa marital presumption of
parentage and would likely permit Florida to apply its own law to
determine the existence of a parent-child relationship between Susan
and Michael. Even if Florida's choice of law rule would have called
for the application of Iowa law to determine the parentage question,
the Constitution would not preclude Florida from invoking a public
policy exception to disregard it.8 7 Thus, in the absence of a judgment
determining Michael to be Susan's child, it is likely that DOMA
would operate only in the background. Surely it would be inconsistent
with state choice of law rules and sound policy for Florida to disregard
Iowa's marital presumption of parentage. But if a Florida court chose
to do so, the Full Faith and Credit Clause would likely permit it and
there would be no active role for DOMA to play.
As flexible as the Court has been in permitting states to apply
their own laws to controversies connected with the state, it
nevertheless has clearly rejected a public policy exception to avoid
giving full faith and credit to judgments of sister states. 8 As the
United States Supreme Court stated in Baker v. General Motors Co. 89 :
"[r]egarding judgments ... the full faith and credit obligation is
[Our] decisions support no roving 'public policy
exacting ....
exception' to the full faith and credit due judgments."90 Thus, if an
for a State's substantive law to be selected in a constitutionally permissible manner,
that State must have a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts,
creating state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor
fundamentally unfair.').
87. See, e.g., Baker, 522 U.S. at 233; cf Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage,
Conflict of Laws, and the UnconstitutionalPublic Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J.
1965, 1980 (1997) (footnote omitted) ("Most commentators take the
constitutionality of the public policy doctrine on faith, but a good argument can be
made that it violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause."). Although Professor
Kramer's analysis is forceful, the United States Supreme Court has not yet adopted
it in the context of the credit owed to laws (as opposed to judgments).
88. See, e.g., Baker, 522 U.S. at 233; Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 237
(1908).
89. 522 U.S. 222 (1998).
90. Id. at 233 (citations omitted). I have elaborated upon several reasons for
the differential treatment between the amount of credit owed to laws and judgments.
See Rhonda Wasserman, Are You Still My Mother? Interstate Recognition of
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Iowa court had entered a judgment holding that Susan was Michael's
mother, then the Full Faith and Credit Clause would require Florida to
recognize the parent-child relationship (at least in a suit between the
same parties) 91 notwithstanding its public policy against same-sex
marnage.
For example, imagine that Susan's Iowa employer declined to
recognize Michael as Susan's child for group health insurance
purposes because it was opposed to same-sex marriage. Susan could
file suit in Iowa and obtain a judgment both finding, that under Iowa's
marital presumption of parentage, she is Michael's legal mother and
requiring the employer to provide Michael with health insurance
benefits. If Susan's employer then transferred her to Florida and
declined to provide Michael with insurance benefits, Florida would
have to recognize the Iowa judgment, notwithstanding any policy
objection it might have to Susan and Beth's same-sex marriage or the
parent-child relationship that arguably "arise[s] from such a
marriage." 92
D. DOMA and the Happy Family
In a case like this, where the Full Faith and Credit Clause would
demand recognition of a parent-child relationship "arising from" a
same-sex marriage, DOMA would emerge from the background. But
DOMA, which Congress enacted to protect marriage in order to
provide a nurturing and stable environment for child-rearing, 9 3 could
ironically have precisely the opposite effect. Section two of DOMA
provides that "[n]o State ... shall be required to give effect to any ...
Adoption by Gays and Lesbians, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 29-32 (2008).
91. Ordinarily a judgment is binding only on the parties to the action. See, e.g.,
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940). But a judgment affecting personal status
may have a "transformational" effect that "others must recognize, at least until they
come forward to assert their own claims through litigation ...

."

FLEMING JAMES,

JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 715 (5th ed. 2001); see also Wasserman, supra note
90, at 47-49 (explaining how parentage determination likely has such a
transformational effect).
92. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.212(2) (West 2010). This is a variant of a
hypothetical situation regarding same-sex marriage that was posed in Jeffrey L.
Rensberger, Same-Sex Marriagesand the Defense of MarriageAct: A Deviant View
of an Experiment in Full Faith and Credit, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 409, 446 (1998).
93. See supra Part II.
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judicial proceeding of any other State . .. respecting a relationship
between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the
laws of such other State ... or a right or claim arisingfrom such
relationship."9 4 Thus, DOMA would authorize Florida to disregard the
Iowa court's judgment that Michael is Susan's child if the parentage
claim is seen as "arising from" the marriage, 95 and if section two of
DOMA is constitutional.9 6
In our hypothetical, the Iowa court would have found that Susan
and Beth's same-sex marriage was valid under its laws and would
have applied the marital presumption of parentage to support Susan's
claim. Since Susan's parental relationship with Michael would have
derived from her marriage to Beth, it is possible, if not likely, that
under DOMA Florida would be free to disregard the Iowa judgment
because it resolved a claim "arising from" a same-sex marriage. 9 7
94. Defense of Marriage Act, § 2(a), Pub. L. No. 104-199 (1996) 110 Stat.
2419 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006)) (emphasis added).
95. Cf Joslin, supra note 58, at 598 ("[T]here is nothing in the language or
history of DOMA that suggests it was intended to authorize courts to depart from the
usual rules that apply to judicial orders about children born to and raised by [samesex] couples.").
96. The constitutionality vel non of DOMA, which has been called into serious
question by many, is beyond the scope of this article. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC.
13299, 13360 (1996) (letter to Sen. Kennedy from Professor Laurence H. Tribe)
("[T]he congressional power to 'prescribe ... the effect' of sister-state ...
proceedings, within the context of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, includes no
congressional power to prescribe that some ... proceedings shall ... be entitled to

no faith or credit at all!"); ANDREW KOPPELMAN, SAME SEX, DIFFERENT STATES:
WHEN SAME-SEX MARRIAGES CROSS STATE LINES 126-27 (2006) (identifying equal
protection problems with DOMA because it "single[s] out gays for extraordinary
burdens"); Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage, Choice of Law, and Public
Policy, 76 TEX. L. REv. 921, 974 (1998) (footnote omitted) ("[I[t is doubtful that
Congress has the power . . . to nullify the self-executing force of the Full Faith and

Credit Clause."); see also Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 37677 (D. Mass. 2010); Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 698 F.
Supp. 2d 234, 234 (D. Mass. 2010) (both holding that section three of DOMA is
unconstitutional).
97. See In re Sebastian, 879 N.Y.S.2d 677, 684 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2009) ("[MiniDOMAs] would appear to permit courts ... to deny recognition ... to legal rights

flowing from [same-sex] marriages, including presumptive parenthood. Such a
position is supported by DOMA."); see also Strasser, supra note 3, at 1845
(footnotes omitted) ("[T]he presumption of parentage created by a child's birth into
a civil union would not have to be recognized by other states [under DOMA].").
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Alternatively, if Susan and Beth had not married, but all other facts
remained the same, an Iowa court might have nevertheless found
Susan to be Michael's parent on a de facto parentage or estoppel
theory because Susan received Michael into her home and held him
out as her own child.98 If the Iowa court held that Susan was
Michael's parent without relying on the marital presumption of
parentage, its judgment would be entitled to full faith and credit in
Florida. DOMA would no longer free Florida of its obligation to
recognize the Iowa judgment because the parent-child relationship
between Susan and Michael would no longer "arise from" the samesex marriage, but rather from the nature of the interactions and
commitments between parent and child.9 9 Ironically then, DOMAwhich was designed to protect marriage as a means of protecting
children-appears to provide children with less protection if their
parents marry and rely on the marital presumption of parentage than if
they do not marry and instead rely on a defacto parentage theory. The
couple's willingness to commit to one another in marriage, which in
the heterosexual context is celebrated as a means of providing greater
security for children, ironically has the opposite effect when the
parents are gay or lesbian.
Before closing, I want to note that this irony may be avoided if
courts read DOMA narrowly to limit its impact on parent-child
relationships. Several examples from the case law are illustrative.
First, in the context of unhappy families, courts have considered
whether a child custody or visitation order in favor of a gay or lesbian
co-parent is governed by the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act
("PKPA"), which requires its enforcement in other states,100 or
98. See, e.g., Elisa B. v. Super. Ct., 117 P.3d 660, 670 (Cal. 2005) (holding
that the lesbian partner of the twins' biological mother, who had received them into
her home and held them out as her own children, was the children's second parent);
In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 163 (Wash. 2005) ("Washington's common
law recognizes the status of defacto parents and grants them standing to petition for
a determination of the rights and responsibilities that accompany legal parentage in
this state."); see also Harris, supranote 22, at 624-26, 630-31; Joslin, supra note 58,
at 579-80.
99. See Prashad v. Copeland, 685 S.E.2d 199, 207 (Va. Ct. App. 2009)
(finding DOMA irrelevant where "the custody orders [in favor of two men, who
were domestic partners under California law] did not arise from [their] relationship
being treated as a marriage," but rather by virtue of their relationship with the child).
100. Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, § 8(a), Pub. L. No. 96-611,
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DOMA, which frees states of that obligation if the order "arises from"
10 Several courts
a same-sex marriage or marriage-like relationship.o
have avoided the issue by concluding that DOMA was not applicable
to the facts of the case.102 At least one court that addressed the issue
head-on found no evidence that DOMA "was intended to affect or
partially repeal the PKPA,"l 03 and rejected "repeal by implication."' 04
Professor Mark Strasser adds that the PKPA itself was amended after
the enactment of DOMA, but included no exception for custody or
visitation rights arising from a same-sex relationship, reinforcing the
conclusion that DOMA has no effect on the PKPA.'s Thus, it is
possible for DOMA to be read narrowly to limit interference with
enforcement of child custody and visitation orders entered in disputes
between gay and lesbian parents.
Second, several courts have managed to avoid applying DOMA
(or state law mini-DOMAs) by finding the parent-child relationships
at issue did not "arise from" a same-sex marriage or marriage-like
relationship. 0 6 For example, in a custody dispute between lesbian
parents of three adopted children, the Michigan Court of Appeals in
Giancasprov. Congleton'0 7 held that Michigan's mini-DOMA did not
affect the obligation of a Michigan court to recognize an Illinois

94 Stat. 3566 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2006)) (requiring states to enforce,
and barring states from modifying child custody and visitation orders of other states
that are made consistently with the Act).
101. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).
102. See, e.g., Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951, 961-62 (Vt.
2006) (declining to decide "whether DOMA, and not the PKPA, governs to
determine the effect of a Vermont custody or visitation decision based on a civil
union"); Prashad,685 S.E.2d at 207 (declining to determine whether DOMA had an
impact on the PKPA; concluding that DOMA did not apply).
103. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d 330, 336 (Va. Ct. App.
2006), aff'd, 661 S.E.2d 822 (Va. 2008); see also Strasser, supra note 3, at 1840
(footnotes omitted) ("[Finding] no evidence that it was Congress's intent to modify
the PKPA when it passed DOMA, even bracketing the presumption against reading
an implicit repeal into a statute.").
104. Miller-Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d at 336-37.
105. Strasser, supra note 3, at 1841-42.
106. See, e.g., Giancaspro v. Congleton, Docket No. 283267, 2009 WL
416301 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2009) (per curiam); Prashad,685 S.E.2d at 199.
107. No. 283267, 2009 WL 416301 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2009).
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adoption by the lesbian couple.' 0 8 The Full Faith and Credit Clause
required Michigan to recognize the Illinois adoption even if the couple
could not have jointly adopted the children in Michigan.10 9 The court
concluded that neither a Michigan constitutional provision"o nor a
Michigan statute,"' which precluded the recognition of same-sex
marriage in Michigan, altered the result because "[t]he only relevant
consideration in this matter is each individual party's established
relationship as an adoptive parent with the children, not their
relationship with each other."ll 2
Interestingly, one of the women argued that the adoption by her
former partner was a second-parent adoption, a type of adoption
typically available only when a couple is in a marriage-like
relationship." 3 Thus, the woman argued that her former partner's
relationship with her children ultimately derived from the "same-sex
lesbian relationship between the parties."" 4 Her former partner
disclaimed the "second-parent" adoption label. Without determining
whether or not the adoption had been a second-parent adoption, the
108. Id. at *2.
109. Id. at *2, *4.
110. MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 25 ("To secure and preserve the benefits of
marriage for our society and for future generations of children, the union of one man
and one woman in marriage shall be the only agreement recognized as a marriage or
similar union for any purpose.").
111. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 551.1 (1979) ("Marriage is inherently a unique
relationship between a man and a woman. As a matter of public policy, this state has
a special interest inencouraging, supporting, and protecting that unique relationship
in order to promote, among other goals, the stability and welfare of society and its
children. A marriage contracted between individuals of the same sex is invalid in
this state.").
112. Giancaspro,2009 WL 416301, at *4; see also Prashad,685 S.E.2d at
203 (holding that the case involved the obligation of Virginia, under the PKPA and
Virginia law, to recognize a North Carolina custody order in favor of the child's two
fathers; since neither the fathers nor their adversary, the surrogate who bore their
child, was "seeking to have the [California] civil union between [the two men]
recognized under Virginia law . . . this case is not about homosexual marriage, civil

unions, or same-sex relationships").
113. "Like a step-parent adoption, a second-parent (or co-parent) adoption
permits the partner of a child's biological or adoptive parent to adopt the child
without first terminating the parental rights of the custodial biological or adoptive
parent." Wasserman, supra note 90, at 7 n.25 (citations omitted).
114. Giancaspro,2009 WL416301, at *1.
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court focused exclusively on "each individual party's established
relationship as an adoptive parent with the children, not their
relationship with each other," 15 rejecting the claim that the parental
relationship derived from the couple's relationship." 6
Similarly, in Prashadv. Copeland,"7 a gay couple entered into an
agreement with a surrogate to carry their child." 8 After the child was
born, and the relationship between the men and the surrogate soured,
the men traveled to California and entered into a domestic
partnership." 9 Sometime later, the surrogate filed suit in North
Carolina seeking custody of the child and a determination stating
which of the men was the child's genetic father.12 0 The North Carolina
court granted primary custody to the men.121 The men and the child
later moved to Virginia, and the surrogate filed suit there seeking
modification of the custody order.12 2 The court concluded that DOMA
did not free the Virginia court of the obligation to recognize the North
Carolina order, noting that "neither party is asking the Court to
recognize [the men's] relationship as a valid marriage in the
Commonwealth of Virginia .... [T]he custody orders did not arise
from [their] relationship being treated as a marriage, [therefore]
DOMA is inapplicable to the present case." 2 3 For similar reasons, the
court concluded that Virginia's mini-DOMA, adopted as the Virginia

115. Id. at *4; see also OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
WHETHER THE DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT PRECLUDES THE NON-BIOLOGICAL
CHILD OF A MEMBER OF A VERMONT CIVIL UNION FROM QUALIFYING FOR CHILD'S
INSURANCE BENEFITS UNDER THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT (2007), availableat 2007
WL 5254330, at *4 (citations omitted) (determining that for purposes of a child's
eligibility for insurance benefits under the Federal Social Security Act, "the fact that
[his] right of inheritance ultimately derives from Vermont's recognition of a samesex civil union is simply immaterial under DOMA"; interpreting section 3 of
DOMA, which defines the word "marriage" for federal law purposes as "a legal
union between one man and one woman as husband and wife").
116. Giancaspro,2009 WL 416301, at *4.
117. 685 S.E.2d 199 (Va. Ct. App. 2009).
118. Id. at 201.
119. Id.at 201-02.
120. Id.at 202.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 207.
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constitution, 124 was

not

25

implicated.1

The surrogate pressed the issue further, arguing that the North
Carolina custody order "tacitly" recognized the men's relationship
because "the only basis that the North Carolina court had to grant
custody to [the non-biological father] was his relationship with [his
partner]."126 The Virginia court rejected this argument because North
Carolina, like Virginia, declines to recognize same-sex marriages. It
would have been "highly illogical" for the North Carolina court to
have granted the "[non-biological father] custodial rights based on a
relationship that the State of North Carolina does not recognize and
that the North Carolina court does not acknowledge in its orders." 27
The Virginia court concluded that the North Carolina court had
permitted the non-biological father to intervene in the initial custody
proceeding not because of his relationship with the biological father,
but because of his relationship with the child.128
As these cases illustrate, an exclusive focus on the parent-child
relationship, rather than on the underlying relationship between the
couple, may permit courts to avoid DOMA's ironic and devastating
effect on the integrity and portability of legal relationships between
gay and lesbian parents and their children.
V. CONCLUSION
Congress enacted DOMA to protect the institution of marriage
and to ensure children have the security of a two-parent household.
Like DOMA, the marital presumption of parenthood and the United
States Supreme Court case law on the constitutional rights of unwed

124. The Virginia Marriage Amendment provides, in relevant part: "[t]his
Commonwealth and its political subdivisions shall not create or recognize a legal
status for relationships of unmarried individuals that intends to approximate the
design, qualities, significance, or effects of marriage. Nor shall this Commonwealth
or its political subdivisions create or recognize another union, partnership, or other
legal status to which is assigned the rights, benefits, obligations, qualities, or effects
of marriage." VA. CONST. art. I, § 15-A.
125. Prashad,685 S.E.2d at 207.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 207-08.
128. Id. at 208.
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fathers reflect a deep respect for the institution of marriage and
acknowledge the benefits children receive when they are raised in an
intact family. When a heterosexual couple marries, the partners not
only create a legal bond between themselves, but they strengthen their
legal ties to their children. It is deeply ironic, then, that when a gay
and lesbian couple makes the same choice-to marry-DOMA
threatens, rather than strengthens, any parent-child relationship that
derives from the marriage.

